In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on "nomic conjunctive theories", i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impossibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative notion of the verisimilitude of such theories, and identify suitable conditions concerning the (partial) correctness of acquired data, under which revising our theories by data leads us closer to "the nomic truth", construed as the target of scientific inquiry. We conclude by indicating some further developments, generalizations, and open issues arising from our results.
1 An excellent survey of the main post-Popperian accounts of verisimilitude can be found in Niiniluoto (1998) . See also Zwart (2001) . 2 The debate on nomic verisimilitude was triggered by Leonard J. Cohen's suggestion (Cohen 1980 ) that the main goal of scientific inquiry is legisimilitude, i.e., closeness to truth about natural necessity (see also Cohen 1987) . Earlier attempts to offer an adequate formal notion of nomic verisimilitude, or approximation to the physically necessary truth, include Oddie (1982; 1986, Sect. 5.4) , Kuipers (1982; , and Niiniluoto (1983; 1987, Chap. 11 ).
The basic feature approach to verisimilitude
In a number of recent papers, Cevolani et al. have developed a basic feature approachfor short, Suppose that the basic features of the domain under inquiry U ("the world") are described by a language L. Then, "the whole truth"-or simply "the truth"-about U in L can be construed as the most complete true description (in L) of the basic features of U. Given a theory T in L, the basic content of T can be seen as the information conveyed by T about the basic features of U. Then, according to the BF-approach, the verisimilitude of T is interpreted in terms of the balance of true and false information conveyed by T about the basic features of U.
The BF-approach may be illustrated assuming that the world U is described by a propositional language L n with n atomic sentences p 1 , . . . , p n . The basic features of U are then described by the so-called literals of L n . A literal is either an atomic sentence p i or the negation ¬ p i of an atomic sentence; thus, for any atomic sentence p i , there is a pair of literals ( p i , ¬ p i ) whose elements are said to be the dual of each other. Of course, the set B = {p 1 , ¬ p 1 , . . . , p n , ¬ p n } of the literals of L n contains 2n members. In the following, a literal of L n will be denoted by "± p i ", where ± is either empty or "¬"; p i is called the positive literal with p i and ¬ p i is called the negative literal with p i . A constituent C of L n is defined as a conjunction of n literals, one for each atomic sentence. 4 A constituent will thus have the following form:
One can check that there are exactly q = 2 n constituents and that only one is true. The true constituent, denoted by "C ", can be identified with "the (whole) truth" in L n .
A conjunctive theory T of L n -"c-theory", for short-is a conjunction of k literals concerning k different atomic sentences. A c-theory will thus have the following form:
where 0 ≤ k ≤ n. A tautological c-theory, denoted by " ", is a c-theory such that k = 0, whereas a c-theory with k = n is a constituent. 5 A literal ± p i occurring as a conjunct of a c-theory T will be called a basic (b-)claim of T . 6 The set T b of all the b-claims of a c-theory T will be referred to as the basic (b-)content of T . The set formed by the duals of the b-claims of T will be denoted by "T d "; of course, |T b | = |T d |. Finally, the set of the atomic sentences p i of L n 3 For early motivation see Festa (2007) and, for some applications, Cevolani et al. (2010) and Cevolani et al. (2011) . It is now clear that the key ideas underlying the BF-approach have been anticipated by Kuipers (1982) . 4 See, for instance, Hintikka (1973, p. 152). such that neither p i nor ¬ p i is a b-claim of T will be denoted by "T ? ". Note that T ? corresponds to the set of the basic features of U about which T does not say anything, that is, remains silent. Indeed, the symbol "T ? " is motivated by the fact that T ? can be seen as the "question mark area" of T .
Given a constituent C and a c-theory T , we say that a b-claim ± p i of T is true in C just in case ± p i ∈ C b ; otherwise, it is false in C. Accordingly, T b can be partitioned into two subsets with respect to C: 1) the set t (T, C)
T which are true in C, and 2) the set f (T, C) df = T b \ C b of the b-claims of T which are false in C. We shall say that t (T, C) is the true b-content of T with respect to C, while f (T, C) is the false b-content of T with respect to C. Given a non-tautological c-theory T , we will say that T is (completely) true in C just in case t (T, C) = T b , that T is false in C when T is not true in C and that T is completely false in C when t (T, C) = ∅.
The verisimilitude of T can be understood as the similarity, or closeness, of T to the true constituent C . The key intuition underlying the BF-approach is that T is highly verisimilar if T tells many things about the basic features of U, as described by C , and many of those things are true. Calling each true b-claim of T a match, and each false b-claim a mistake of T , we may say that T is highly verisimilar if T makes many matches and few mistakes about C , i.e., if T b contains many true b-claims and few false b-claims. This intuition suggests the following comparative notion of verisimilitude for c-theories: 7
Definition 1 Given two c-theories T 1 and T 2 , T 2 is more verisimilar than T 1 -in symbols, T 2 > vs T 1 -iff one of the following conditions holds:
In words, T 2 is more verisimilar than T 1 either if T 2 makes more matches, but no more mistakes, than T 1 or if T 2 makes fewer mistakes than T 1 , and at least the same matches. 8 It is worth noting that, besides proper mistakes, a c-theory T will typically also commit omissions or "errors of ignorance", corresponding to the members of T ? . 9 In 7 Definition 1 is equivalent to Kuipers1982's definition of "descriptive verisimilitude" (cf. Kuipers 1982 , Definition 2 on p. 355). 8 One may note that Definition 1 is structurally identical to Popper's comparative definition of verisimilitude (Popper 1963, p. 233) . The crucial difference is that, while Popper's definition is stated in terms of the "truth content" and the "falsity content" of logically closed theories, defined as the classes of their true and false logical consequences, respectively, our Definition 1 is stated in terms of the "true b-content" and "false bcontent" of c-theories. Since c-theories are conjunctions of "elementary" (atomic and logically independent) truths and falsehoods, our proposal essentially amounts to restricting Popper's set-theoretical comparisons of truth and falsity contents to the sets of elementary truths and falsehoods. Moreover, it should be noted that Definition 1 agrees with all the intuitive judgements of comparative verisimilitude for propositional c-theories stated by Tichy (1974, p. 159; 1976, p. 26) so that it may be seen as a compact reformulation of Tichy's intuitions. 9 The expression "error of ignorance" is borrowed from Niiniluoto (1987 ), p. 159. Following Kuipers (1999 , such errors of ignorance may also be called the lacunae of T (cf. also Aliseda 2005). contrast, a constituent C commits no errors of ignorance, since in this case C ? = ∅. Hence, one can prove that, given two constituents C 1 and C 2 ,
Thus, as far as constituents are concerned, Definition 1 reduces to the claim that C 2 is closer to the truth than C 1 if and only if all matches of C 1 are also matches of C 2 (cf. also Kuipers 2000, pp. 150-151) .
Comparative verisimilitude for nomic conjunctive theories
The intuitive idea underlying the notion of nomic verisimilitude introduced by Kuipers (2000) can be expressed as follows. Given a domain of inquiry U, let C = {c 1 , . . . , c n } be the set of all relevant conceptual possibilities which might occur within U. 10 C may be construed as the conceptual frame of a given scientific inquiry, including the relevant kinds of objects, events or states of natural systems or artifacts under investigation.
As an example, C might include four kinds of object: "black raven", "black nonraven", "non-black raven" and "non-black non-raven". One may assume that there is a unique subset P of C, including all the nomic possibilities of U, i.e., all conceptual possibilities which are realizable within U. 11 Here, "nomic possibilities" may assume different meanings, depending on the particular context: e.g., P may contain the physical, chemical, biological, psychological or socio-economical possibilities of C.
The set I df = C \ P is then the set of the nomic impossibilities of U, i.e., of those conceptual possibilities which are unrealizable in U. 12 For example, P might contain the conceptual possibilities "black raven", "black non-raven", and "non-black nonraven", whereas I might contain the conceptual possibility "non-black raven". Since scientists usually aim at understanding and discovering the nomic features of the world, P can be construed as the target, or "the great unknown", of scientific inquiry (Kuipers 2000, pp. 143 ff.) . Accordingly, P may be construed as the (whole) nomic truth about U and the nomic verisimilitude of a nomic theory T may be defined as the similarity of T to the nomic truth P . The problem of nomic verisimilitude thus amounts to the explication of the idea that a given theory T is closer to P than another.
An answer to this problem is provided, in a quite natural way, by the BF-approach to verisimilitude presented in Sect. 1. Here, the conceptual possibilities in C can be expressed within an appropriate nomic propositional language. The basic idea is that, since the conceptual possibilities in U are logically mutually independent, they can be adequately described by the atomic sentences of a suitably interpreted propositional language. More precisely, given a finite conceptual frame C = {c 1 , . . . , c n }, a nomic (propositional) language L n is a propositional language where each atom p i says that the corresponding conceptual possibility c i is a nomic possibility of U. Consequently, a 10 For the sake of simplicity, in the following we shall assume that C is finite.
positive literal p i of L n claims that the conceptual possibility c i is a nomic possibility of C (i.e., that c i ∈ P ), whereas a negative literal ¬ p i claims that c i is a nomic impossibility of C (i.e., that c i ∈ P or, equivalently, c i ∈ I ). A nomic constituent of L n tells, for each conceptual possibility c i of C, whether c i is a nomic possibility or not, i.e., whether p i is true or false. Hence, the true nomic constituent C of L n can be taken as representing the truth about U, since it specifies all the nomic possibilities and impossibilities of C. Indeed, P = {c i : p i ∈ C b } is the set of nomic possibilities, and I = {c i : ¬p i ∈ C b } the set of the nomic impossibilities.
Whereas a nomic constituent provides a complete list of the nomic possibilities and impossibilities of C, a c-theory T of L n -i.e., a nomic c-theory-typically gives an incomplete list of such possibilities and impossibilities. A positive b-claim p i of a nomic c-theory T may be called a possibility claim of T , since it says that the conceptual possibility c i is a nomic possibility; likewise, a negative b-claim ¬ p i may be called an impossibility claim of T , since it says that the conceptual possibility c i is a nomic impossibility. Moreover, it should be noted that the members of T ? correspond to conceptual possibilities about which T does not make any claim.
A comparative definition of what it means for a nomic c-theory T 2 to be closer to the nomic truth P than a nomic c-theory T 1 is immediately obtained by applying Definition 1 to propositional nomic languages. However, the notion of matches and mistakes is now interpreted in nomic terms. This implies that there are two kinds of matches, and two kinds of mistakes, possibly made by a nomic c-theory T . A match of the first kind is a true possibility claim of T , corresponding to a nomic possibility correctly identified by T . Likewise, a match of the second kind is a true impossibility claim of T , corresponding to a nomic impossibility correctly excluded by T . Conversely, a mistake of the first kind is a false possibility claim of T , corresponding to a nomic impossibility erroneously admitted by T as a nomic possibility; while a mistake of the second kind is a false impossibility claim of T , corresponding to a nomic possibility erroneously excluded by T as a nomic impossibility. According to Definition 1, T 2 is more verisimilar than T 1 if, for both kinds of matches and mistakes, either T 2 makes more matches, but no more mistakes, than T 1 or T 2 makes fewer mistakes than T 1 , and at least the same matches.
Changing nomic theories in response to data
A basic problem in the analysis of rational theory change is given by theory revision, i.e., by the revision of our theories in response to new evidence. This can be seen as a particular case of the general problem of belief change, which has been intensively investigated by logicians starting at least from Alchourrón et al. (1985) . Within their approach-the so called "AGM approach"-a belief system is confronted with a "(doxastic) input", which may cause some new information to be added to the system, or some old information to be withdrawn from it. In the AGM approach, the belief system is represented by a logically closed set of sentences in a propositional language, called a belief set or a theory, and a doxastic input by a single sentence to be added to the belief set. Cevolani et al. (2011) have studied the case of "conjunctive theory change", where both the belief system and the input are expressed in the form of c-theories. As shown below, their analysis, summarized in Sect. 3.1, can be easily applied also to the problem of nomic theory change (Sect. 3.2).
Conjunctive theory change
The problem of conjunctive theory change amounts to the analysis of how a given c-theory T changes in response to some newly acquired information represented by input A, also expressed in the form of a c-theory. Two cases have to be distinguished. First, A may be logically compatible with T : in this case, the result of changing T by A is represented by the c-theory T + A, called the expansion of T by A. Second, A may be logically incompatible with T : in this case, the result of changing T by A is represented by the c-theory T * A, called the revision of T by A.
Both the expansion and the revision of T by A can be analyzed by distinguishing three "parts" of input A (cf. Fig. 1 ):
(i) the overlapping part of A (with respect to T ), i.e., the conjunction of the elements of A b ∩ T b , denoted by A oT ; (ii) the conflicting part of A (with respect to T ), i.e., the conjunction of the elements of A b ∩ T d , denoted by A cT ; (iii) the excess part of A (with respect to T ), i.e., the conjunction of the elements of
The "new" information conveyed by A with respect to T can be specified in terms of the three parts of A just described. In fact, the overlapping part of A only conveys "old" information, already expressed by the b-claims of T . In contrast, both the conflicting and the excess part of A conveys some "new" information with respect to T , in the sense that they are not entailed by T . For this reason, we may call the conjunction of the two non-overlapping parts of A-i.e., A cT ∧ A xT -the new part of A (with respect to T ). Let us consider, first of all, the case where A is logically compatible with T . In such case, the conflicting part of A with respect to T is tautological. Given that the overlapping part of A is contained in T , the new part of A is then given by its excess part. The result of changing T by A is the new c-theory T + A, called the expansion of T by A, which can be expressed as follows: 
If also the excess part of A is tautological, then T + A is trivially equivalent to T . In contrast, a genuine expansion of T by A fills, so to speak, some of the lacunae of T by transforming some of its omissions into b-claims of T + A. Let us then consider the case where T and A are incompatible. In such case, T must be revised in order to accommodate the new information conveyed by A. In fact, the conflicting part of A contradicts some of the b-claims of T , i.e., the members of T b ∩ A d . When revising T by A, such b-claims must first be removed from T , in order to accept their negations without inconsistency. The result of changing T by A is the c-theory T * A, called the revision of T by A, which can be expressed as follows:
or, equivalently, as
Note that, if T and A are compatible, i.e., if the conflicting part of A is tautological, then the revision is reduced to the expansion of T by A. In contrast, a genuine revision of T by A corrects, so to speak, some of the mistakes of T and possibly fills some of its lacunae. It is worth noting that the overlapping part of A is "irrelevant" to the result of expanding or revising T by A. In fact, it follows from (4) and (5) that:
In words, only the new part of A does really matter when T is changed with respect to A.
Nomic theory change guided by correct data
The problem of nomic theory change, i.e., of changing a nomic theory in response to newly acquired data, has recently been investigated by Kuipers (2011a Kuipers ( , 2011b . In an empirical inquiry about U, two kinds of data are typically available:
1. Data of the first kind are directly provided by experiments and observations, which may realize some conceptual possibilities of C, thus showing that they are nomic possibilities. In fact, only nomic possibilities can be realized and, hence, recorded as experimental results. 2. Data of the second kind are inductively accepted starting from data of the first kind.
Here, some conceptual possibilities of C are ruled out as nomically impossible by inductive generalizations made on the basis of experimental and observational evidence. 13 For example, observing a black raven provides evidence of the first kind, by showing that this kind of bird is a nomic possibility of U. On the other hand, an inductive generalization such as "all ravens are black", claiming that a non-black raven is a nomic impossibility in U, is an example of data of the second kind. These two kinds of data-obtained, directly or indirectly, from experimental and observational evidence-correspond to two different subsets of U. In the following, the set of all the established conceptual possibilities-i.e., of all those possibilities of C that have been realized, through experiments or observations, up to a given timewill be denoted by R. In short, R will be called "the evidence" about U. Assuming that there are no experimental or observational errors, and recalling that only nomic possibilities can be realized, R will be a subset of P . Moreover, the set of conceptual possibilities which are compatible with the strongest inductive generalization accepted up to that moment will be denoted by S; accordingly, the complement of S will include precisely the conceptual possibilities which are ruled out by S as nomically possible. Assuming that the inductive generalization is correct, P will be a subset of S, i.e., S will exclude only nomic impossibilities. In the following, we will assume that both the evidence and the inductive generalizations are correct in the sense that: R ⊆ P ⊆ S. Such assumption, to be called the correct data hypothesis-or CD-hypothesis for short (Kuipers, 2000, p. 157 )-is graphically represented in Fig. 2 .
Nomic theory change can be analyzed in terms of the expansion and revision of a nomic theory by the input represented by data R and S. Within the present framework, both the theory to be changed and the input are represented in the form of nomic c-theories. In fact, given a propositional nomic language L n , the data R and S can be jointly represented as a nomic c-theory-to be called R/S-claiming that all the conceptual possibilities in R are nomic possibilities and all the conceptual possibilities outside S are nomic impossibilities. Thus, R/S may be expressed in the following form:
It follows that the result of changing T by R/S can be represented by the expansion T + R/S of T by R/S, when R/S is compatible with T , or by the revision T * R/S of T by R/S, when R/S is incompatible with T . An interesting question concerning the relationship between nomic theory change and nomic truth approximation is the following: are the expansion T + R/S and the revision T * R/S of T by correct data R/S more verisimilar than T itself? 14 To answer this question, let us note that, since we are assuming that the CD-hypothesis holds, R/S is a true nomic c-theory. In turn, this implies that, if R/S is compatible with T , the excess part of R/S with respect to T will convey some new true information about the world. Thus, any genuine expansion of T by R/S will make more matches and no more mistakes than T , i.e., will be more verisimilar than T according to Definition 1. Moreover, if R/S is incompatible with T , the revision of T by R/S will correct some of the mistakes of T and possibly also add some extra true information. In any case, T * R/S will make more matches and fewer mistakes than T . According to Definition 1, this means that any genuine revision of T by R/S is more verisimilar than T . In sum, all genuine expansions and revisions of T by R/S improve the verisimilitude of T under the CD-hypothesis:
Theorem 1 If the CD-hypothesis holds, then T + R/S > vs T and T * R/S > vs T .
In other words, expanding or revising a theory T by correct data R/S always leads to theories which are closer than T to the whole nomic truth.
Contrast measures of verisimilitude and nomic theory change
In Sect. 3 we showed that nomic theory change guided by correct data leads to nomic truth approximation, when the latter concept is explicated in terms of the comparative notion of verisimilitude introduced in Definition 1. It should be noted, however, that such notion doesn't allow one to compare two arbitrary c-theories with respect to their verisimilitude, but only those c-theories whose true and false b-contents are set-theoretically comparable in terms of the definition. In other words, Definition 1 only specifies a partial order over the whole class of c-theories. For instance, if C = p 1 ∧ p 2 ∧ p 3 is the truth in language L 3 , then we cannot say that T 2 ≡ p 1 ∧ p 2 is more verisimilar than T 1 ≡ ¬p 1 ∧ p 3 -i.e., that T 2 > vs T 1 -since t (T 1 , C ) = { p 3 } and t (T 2 , C ) = {p 1 , p 2 } are not comparable on the basis of Definition 1. In order to compare two arbitrary c-theories with respect to their verisimilitude, one needs to introduce an appropriate verisimilitude measure. In what follows, we will introduce a family of such measures (Sect. 4.1) and we will show how they can be applied to a refined analysis of the relationships between nomic theory change and nomic truth approximation (Sect. 4.2). More precisely, we will prove that nomic truth approximation can be achieved through theory change guided not only by correct but also by partially correct data.
Contrast measures of verisimilitude
In principle, many different verisimilitude measures for c-theories can be defined. Here, we will require that a verisimilitude measure Vs coheres with the comparative notion of verisimilitude introduced in Definition 1, in the following sense:
Coherence. For any pair of c-theories T 1 and T 2 , if T 2 > vs T 1 then Vs(T 2 ) > Vs(T 1 ).
A family of verisimilitude measures of this kind is provided by so-called contrast measures, which are briefly described below. 15 Let us recall from Sect. 1 that, given a constituent C and a c-theory T, t (T, C) and f (T, C) are the true and false b-content, respectively, of T with respect to C. We can now define the degree of true b-content cont t (T, C) and the degree of false b-content cont f (T, C) of T with respect to C as follows:
is the normalized number of matches, and cont f (T, C) the normalized number of mistakes, that T makes with respect to C. Accordingly, cont t (T, C) may be construed as the overall reward attributed to the matches of T and −cont f (T, C) as the overall penalty attributed to the mistakes of T . A contrast measure of similarity between T and C is a weighted average of the prize due to T 's degree of true b-content and of the penalty due to T 's degree of false b-content:
where φ > 0. Intuitively, different values of φ reflect the relative weight assigned to truths and falsities, i.e., to the matches and mistakes of T with respect to C. The verisimilitude Vs φ (T ) of T can be construed as the similarity s(T, C ) of T to the truth, i.e., to the true constituent C of L n . Hence,
One can easily check that Vs φ satisfies the condition of coherence introduced above, i.e. that, given two c-theories T 1 and T 2 , if T 2 > vs T 1 then Vs φ (T 2 ) > Vs φ (T 1 ).
Nomic theory change guided by differentially verisimilar data
The verisimilitude measure Vs φ defined above can be appropriately applied also to propositional nomic languages. This allows one to compare the degrees of verisimilitude Vs φ (T 1 ) and Vs φ (T 2 ) of two arbitrary nomic c-theories T 1 and T 2 . Moreover, one can see that the coherence of Vs φ with the comparative notion > vs immediately implies the following quantitative counterpart of Theorem 1:
Theorem 2 If the CD-hypothesis holds then Vs φ (T + R/S) > Vs φ (T ) and Vs φ (T * R/S) > Vs φ (T ).
In words, any genuine expansion or revision of T by correct data R/S leads to a theory whose degree of verisimilitude, as measured by Vs φ , is higher than that of T .
Apart from reproducing the results obtained on the basis of the comparative notion > vs , the verisimilitude measure Vs φ allows for a more refined analysis of nomic truth approximation through nomic theory change. In particular, we will show that further results can be obtained for the case where nomic theories are changed, not in response to (entirely) correct data, but in response to partially correct data. This amounts to considering the problem of expanding and revising a nomic c-theory T by a nomic c-theory R/S which is not true, but only verisimilar in some suitably defined sense.
The classificatory notion of a verisimilar c-theory can be defined on the basis of any appropriate measure of the verisimilitude of c-theories. Indeed, one may say that a c-theory is verisimilar if and only if its verisimilitude exceeds some fixed threshold. Although one can select, in principle, any degree of verisimilitude as the fixed threshold, as far as contrast measures are concerned a plausible choice is given by the degree of verisimilitude of a tautological c-theory . In fact, since makes no claim at all about the world (i.e., b = ∅), it is easy to check that, for any contrast measure Vs φ , Vs φ ( ) = 0. The verisimilitude Vs φ (T ) of a non-tautological c-theory T is higher or lower than 0 depending on the number of the matches and mistakes of T , and on their relative weight. Accordingly, we introduce the following definition of verisimilar c-theories and of c-theories which are distant from the truth-or t-distant for short:
Definition 2 Given a c-theory T , we say that: (i) T is verisimilar if and only if Vs φ (T ) > 0; (ii) T is t-distant if and only if Vs φ (T ) < 0.
Coming back to the problem of nomic theory change, at first sight one might believe that expanding or revising a nomic c-theory T by verisimilar data R/S should lead to theories T + R/S and T * R/S which are closer to the truth than T . However, on closer inspection, this cannot be expected in general, since R/S might be verisimilar only due to its overlapping part with respect to T , whereas its new part is t-distant. In this case, since what really does matter is the verisimilitude of the new part of R/S, the expansion and the revision of T by R/S might be in fact less verisimilar than T . For the sake of illustration, let us consider the contrast measure of verisimilitude Vs 1 , with φ = 1, defined as follows:
Given a nomic c-theory T, Vs 1 (T ) simply amounts to the difference between the number of matches and the number of mistakes of T , normalized by n. Note that R/S is verisimilar with respect to Vs 1 just in case R/S makes more true than false b-claims, and is t-distant in the opposite case. To see why the revision of T by verisimilar data R/S may be less verisimilar than T , let us consider the following example.
Example 1 Suppose that p 1 , . . . , p 10 are true literals of a given nomic propositional language L n . Then, given c-theory T = p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p 5 ∧ ¬p 6 and data R/S = p 2 ∧ · · · ∧ p 6 ∧ ¬p 7 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬p 10 , one can see that Vs 1 (T ) = 4 n and Vs 1 (R/S) = 1 n . Hence, R/S is verisimilar. However, one can check that the revision of T by R/Si.e., T * R/S = p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p 6 ∧ ¬p 7 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬p 10 -is less verisimilar than T , since Vs 1 (T * R/S) = 2 n . This is due to the fact that the high verisimilitude of R/S is mainly due to its overlapping part with respect to T , i.e., to R/S oT = p 2 ∧ · · · ∧ p 5 , and this part plays no role in the revision of T .
Example 1 might suggest that if the new part of R/S is verisimilar, then the revision of T by R/S is more verisimilar than T . However, even this weaker expectation can not be fulfilled in general, as the following exam shows.
Example 2 Suppose again that p 1 , . . . , p 10 are all true in L n . Then, given c-theory T = p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p 4 ∧ ¬p 5 and data R/S = ¬p 2 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬p 5 ∧ p 6 ∧ · · · ∧ p 10 , one can see that Vs 1 (T ) = 3 n and Vs 1 (R/S) = 1 n . Moreover, one can see that R/S is verisimilar and conveys only new information with respect to T , since the overlapping part of R/S is tautological. However, one can check that
n . This is due to the fact that R/S is verisimilar only because its excess part is highly verisimilar, while its conflicting part is t-distant, thus making the revision of T by R/S less verisimilar than T .
Examples 1 and 2 show that, in the case where data are not entirely correct, i.e., R/S is not true, no condition as simple as the CD-hypothesis can be specified according to which the revision of T by R/S is more verisimilar than T . In particular, neither the fact that R/S is verisimilar, nor the fact that its new part with respect to T is verisimilar, is sufficient to guarantee that T * R/S is more verisimilar than T . However, one can consider the differentially verisimilar data hypothesis-or DVD-hypothesis for short-according to which the "relevant parts" of R/S, and not R/S itself, are verisimilar. These relevant parts are the conflicting and the excess parts of R/S with respect to T :
Definition 3 Given a nomic c-theory T , R/S is differentially verisimilar with respect to T if and only if both Vs φ (R/S cT ) > 0 and Vs
One can then prove that, under the DVD-hypothesis, any genuine expansion or revision of T by R/S is more verisimilar than T : 
Theorem 3 If the DVD-hypothesis holds, then Vs 1 (T + R/S) > Vs 1 (T ) and Vs
The DVD-hypothesis implies that both Vs 1 (R/S cT ) > 0 and Vs 1 (R/S xT ) > 0. Since Vs 1 (R/S cT ) > 0, R/S cT makes more matches than mistakes; then, by definition, T cR/S makes more mistakes than matches, i.e., Vs 1 (T cR/S ) < 0. It follows that Vs 1 (T * R/S) > Vs 1 (T ).
In other words, if the DVD-hypothesis holds-i.e., if R/S is differentially verisimilar with respect to T , even if not true-then expansions and revisions of T by R/S will be more verisimilar than T . It is worth noting that, although Theorem 3 is formulated in terms of the particular measure Vs 1 , a general version of this result can be proved, with appropriate modifications, for all contrast measures Vs φ with φ = 1. 17
Comparisons and extensions of the present approach to (nomic) verisimilitude
In this paper, both a comparative and a quantitative notion of verisimilitude for nomic conjunctive theories has been defined and applied to the problem of nomic truth approximation through theory change. In particular, we identified suitable conditions concerning the (partial) correctness of acquired data, under which revising our theories by data leads us closer to the target of scientific inquiry, construed as the nomic truth about a given domain. Such results suggest some interesting directions for further research. In particular, we will point out some conceptual relations between our BFapproach and other approaches to (nomic) verisimilitude, and suggest some possible extensions and generalizations of the BF-approach.
Conceptual relations between the BF-approach and the content, consequence, and likeness approaches to verisimilitude. During the last 30 years, theories of verisimilitude have been commonly classified into two rival camps, i.e., the content approach and the likeness approach. The problem as to whether these approaches are compatible, and can be combined in a fruitful way, was first raised by Zwart (2001) and then investigated in a number of papers in this journal: see Zwart and Franssen (2007) ; Schurz and Weingartner (2010), and Oddie (2011) . Taking a cue from Schurz and Weingartner, Oddie argues that the traditional content/likeness dichotomy should be replaced by a more adequate classification, which takes into account a third, distinct approach, the so-called consequence approach. After providing an unified characterization of these three approaches, Oddie proves that they cannot be combined in a fruitful way, i.e., without trivializing the notion of verisimilitude. With reference to such results about the impossibility of reconciliation of the three approaches, an anonymous referee for this journal asks to specify the conceptual relations between our BF-approach and (the various desiderata characterizing) the content, consequence, and likeness approaches to verisimilitude. Here, we can only make some short remarks on this issue.
First of all, it should be recalled that the verisimilitude ordering-for short, > vs -ordering-introduced in Definition 1 (see Sect. 1), does not apply to any kind of theory but only to c-theories. This means that, in principle, the > vs -ordering might be in agreement with different, and mutually incompatible, "general" approaches to verisimilitude, applicable to any kind of theory. In other words, it might be the case that the > vs -ordering of c-theories is, so to speak, a common fragment of different, and mutually incompatible, general verisimilitude orderings of theories.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that the > vs -ordering is indeed compatible with all the three approaches to verisimilitude analyzed by Oddie, as the following quick remarks should make clear. 18 First, the > vs -ordering is compatible with the consequence approach as characterized by Oddie (2011, Sect. 4) . More precisely, the > vs -ordering can be seen as a special case of a version of the consequence approach proposed by Schurz and Weingartner (2010) under the label of relevant element approach. 19 Secondly, as far as the likeness approach is concerned (Oddie 2011, Sects. 5 and 6) , one can prove two closely related results: (1) the average likeness measure of verisimilitude, suggested by Tichý (1974) and Oddie (1986) , coheres with the > vs -ordering, in the sense of coherence defined at the beginning of Sect. 4.1, and (2) the > vs -ordering is compatible with all the desiderata for the likeness approach suggested by Oddie. Thirdly, let us consider the relations between the > vs -ordering and the content approach (Oddie 2011, Sect. 3). Oddie argues that a necessary ingredient of any version of the content approach is the following condition, that he calls the strong value of content for truths: if T 1 and T 2 are true, and T 1 strictly entails T 2 , then T 1 is strictly more verisimilar than T 2 . A glance at the first clause of Definition 1 is sufficient to show that the > vs -ordering for c-theories fulfills the above condition.
Extensions of the BF-approach to different kinds of language. As suggested by Cevolani et al. (2011) , the notion of conjunctive theory can be appropriately defined within many kinds of languages besides propositional languages. In this connection, one should note that our approach can be generalized to any language characterized by a suitable notion of constituent-where a constituent is informally defined as a maximally informative conjunction of elementary (atomic and logically independent) claims about the world. In such "languages with constituents", in fact, a c-theory can be conveniently defined as a "fragment" of a constituent, i.e., in the terminology adopted by Oddie (1986) , as a quasi-constituent. This suggests that the BF-approach to verisimilitude can be easily extended to any language with constituents. A further extension, discussed by Festa (2012) , deals with the verisimilitude of theories defined within quantitative languages, including quantitative, statistical and tendency hypotheses.
Extensions of the BF-approach to nomic verisimilitude. Some extensions of the present approach to nomic verisimilitude are worth mentioning. First, one doesn't need to assume that the set of conceptual possibilities characterizing the target domain U is finite. Indeed, Kuipers (2011b) offers a generalization of the present approach to the case of a possibly infinite universe, where theoretical claims are interpreted in several ways, notably as nomic states in and out of equilibrium and as instantiated and non-instantiated "Q-predicates" of a monadic language (cf. also Festa 2007 and Niiniluoto 2011) . Second, the present approach is based on Kuipers' (2000) theory of nomic verisimilitude. Although a comparison with other proposals in the literature is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that the BF-approach might be fruitfully applied also in contexts different from the present one. Indeed, current theories of legisimilitude typically construe nomic verisimilitude as similarity to the true constituent C either of a second-order language (Oddie, 1986, Sect. 5.4) or of a first-order modal language (Niiniluoto, 1987, Chap. 11) , where C expresses the relevant nomic relations holding amongst the conceptual possibilities of the domain. As far as these relations can be expressed as conjunctions of elementary statements about the domain, the BF-approach can be applied to evaluate the verisimilitude of different nomic theories, along the lines suggested above. In particular, as noted by an anonymous referee for this journal, Oddie's approach to nomic verisimilitude, which is based on the idea of reducing truths about nomic necessity to certain basic propositions about relations between universals in a second-order framework, is not entirely dissimilar to the approach outlined in the present paper.
Generalized contrast measures of nomic verisimilitude.
The Vs φ measures introduced above (Sect. 4.1) are only a subset of the much richer class of contrast measures of verisimilitude, discussed in full details by Cevolani and Festa (2012) . In particular, a peculiar feature of Vs φ is that, when evaluating the verisimilitude Vs φ (T ) of a nomic c-theory T , the matches and mistakes of T concerning both nomic possibilities and nomic impossibilities are equally weighted. More precisely, if p i is a true possibility claim and ¬ p j is a true impossibility claim of T , each of them is simply counted as a true b-claim of T in the calculation of Vs φ (T ). Likewise, both the false possibility claim p j and the false impossibility claim ¬ p i will be equally evaluated as false b-claims of T . However plausible this assumption may be in general, it is not necessarily appropriate in all contexts. For instance, suppose that in a given conceptual frame C, nomic possibilities are more important or more relevant than nomic impossibilities; or that nomic possibilities are very rare as compared to the nomic impossibilities of U. This suggests that the (true and false) possibility claims of a theory should weigh more than its (true and false) impossibility claims in assessing its verisimilitude. More generally, matches and mistakes concerning nomic possibilities should be differently weighted, in evaluating the verisimilitude of nomic theories, with respect to matches and mistakes concerning nomic impossibilities. In cases like this, contrast measures can be introduced that treat nomic possibilities and impossibilities in a different manner as far as the evaluation of the verisimilitude of nomic c-theories is concerned. Generalized contrast measures of this kind are discussed both by Cevolani and Festa (2012) and by Kuipers (2011b) .
Refined measures of nomic verisimilitude. An interesting question concerns the possibility of extending our results about truth approximation through theory change to different kinds of verisimilitude measures besides contrast measures. In this connection, it is an open problem whether our results, or at least some of them, can be extended to other measures which, like contrast measures Vs φ , cohere with the comparative ordering of Definition 1.
An anonymous referee for this journal has noted that our approach can not account for the fact that one mistake may be less severe than another. For instance, two quantitative theories may wrongly exclude the same conceptual possibility as a nomic impossibility on the basis of strongly different estimates of the relevant quantities involved. In such case, however, our approach can not differentiate between the two theories as far as their nomic verisimilitude is concerned, since the latter depends only on the number of their mistakes (and matches), and not on the severity of such mistakes. In order to account for cases like this, Kuipers (2000, Ch. 10) has introduced a refined comparative notion of nomic verisimilitude, based on a ternary likeness relation between conceptual possibilities. Building on this refined account, Kuipers (2011a) has also shown that theory revision can be refined to so-called partial meet revision (Alchourrón et al. 1985) in such a way that, assuming correct data, it leads to an at least as successful theory and therefore, due to a "success theorem" (Kuipers, 2000, pp. 160, 260 ff.) , to a potentially more verisimilar theory. Hence, it is a valuable challenge to find out whether the conjunctive approach of nomic theory revision, as elaborated in Sect. 3, can be refined in a similar way, with a similar result (Kuipers 2012) .
